by Christopher Talbot
(Editor’s Note: This is part 3 in a four-part series based on Chris Talbot’s 2024 Theological Integrity seminar at the National Convention. You can click on the hyperlinks to read Part 1 or Part 2).
The Body
I intentionally began with Scripture’s testimony on the subject. Cooper rightly notes, “if anthropological dualism [the view alluded to above] is a human tradition not based in Scripture, we ought to reform our confessions and purge them of such accretions of the Greek mind.”[1] Cooper is certainly correct. If the Scriptures really do not teach some form of substance dualism, where mankind is made of body and soul, then our statement(s) of faith should reflect this accordingly. However, the view of substance dualism has been the predominant view throughout church history, held by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, John Calvin, and others.[2] Therefore, as we move forward, I believe we do so on firm ground.
Philosophical
The Biblical record intersects on this issue with what philosophers call the “mind-body problem.” That is, we are to “wonder what sort of relations there can be between mental things and properties on the one hand and physical things and properties on the other.[3] At the center of this discussion and debate is 17th century French philosopher, René Descartes. Descartes argued that the mind was substantively different than the physical body. This view, of a distinction between mind/soul and body makes up the essence of “substance dualism.” Substance dualism, of one form or another, has arguably been the majority position throughout church history. While this view is an umbrella term for a variety of other views, the basic concept is that “your mind and your brain are two distinct things.”[4] Discussions on substance dualism include questions on the spatial, substantive, and epistemic differences between the mind and the body.[5] As one philosopher put it, this means “Human beings are an ontic duality of body and soul.”[6] Of concern here is how we are to understand the identity of human beings. Are you your soul? Or are you your body? Or are you a combination of the two?
If Cartesian substance dualism, the view propagated by Descartes, takes up one end of the spectrum, the view of “monism” is placed on the other. If dualism is a fundamental difference between the mental (or spiritual) and the physical, then monism argues that mind/spirit and body are all made up one of kind of thing.[7] Put in more specific terms, monists “argue that the phenomenological experiences that we label ‘soul’ are not reducible to brain activity and represent essential aspects or capacities of the self, rather than a substantial, ontological entity such as a ‘soul.’”[8] One author notes, “If monism or ontological holism were true, then there would be an unbreakable connection between a person and her body, the same body [he] ensouled throughout life.”[9] Views on monism seemed to rise with new discoveries in neuroscience, and how the brain and the body interact at a physical level.
Much of this tension between substance dualism and monism is discussed in debates concerning the philosophy of mind. If a person made up of one substance, the monist view, then relations between the mind and the body are often easier to reconcile. For example, issues with the brain as a physical entity, cause effects with the body, which too is a physical thing. For example, when a person has brain damage, the body is affected accordingly. Further, when something happens to the body physically, like a hand being burned, the brain reacts to this physical stimulus. Thus, there is necessarily a connection between mind and body. The monist would argue that this connection is because they are of the same substance, and are not separate things. As with any debate, these two positions only operate as ends of a spectrum, rather than two succinct categories. Between these two views are positions that include, but are not limited to: reductive materialism, radical dualism, substance dualism, emergent dualism, nonreductive physicalism, and a constitution view of persons.[10]
From a Christian philosophical perspective J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae argue for a Thomistic-like substance dualism regarding the nature of man. They understand man’s identity to be found in the soul, but to be causally connected to the body. I am sympathetic to this view, but would want to argue that the identity, ultimately is found in both body and soul. They write, “[T]he soul contains capacities for biological as well as mental functioning… the soul is related to the body more intimately and fully than by way of an external causal connection.”[11] I agree with Moreland and Rae that there is causal connection between the two. For this reason, when something happens to one substance, there is casual relationship with the other substance. That said, I do not believe the Scriptures to place one’s identity in the soul. Instead, along with Forlines, I would agree that the a person is both body and soul.
Offering a theological-philosophical synthesis, John Cooper notes, “Biblical anthropology is demonstrably both holistic and dualist. It is holist in teaching that God created, redeems, and will glorify humans as whole embodied persons. It is dualist in teaching that God created humans of two ingredients and that he sustains persons (souls, spirits) apart from their bodies between death and resurrection.”[12] Cooper is offering a theological-philosophical understanding of man that honors the truth of Scripture that also maintains philosophical viability. Substance dualism, of course, is not unique to Moreland, Rae, or Cooper and has generally been the Christian consensus throughout church history.
Historical
It may also be helpful to briefly look at a historical perspective on this issue. While this is not an exhaustive list of confessional documents for the Free Will/General Baptist tradition, one does hope that it is enough to lay a base line for a consensus concerning. One may benefit by starting with the most seminal figure for this tradition’s theological perspective: James Arminius. Arminius stated that he held to the teachings of the Heidelberg Catechism, as well as the Belgic Confession.[13] The first question of the Heidelberg Catechism reads, “What is thy only comfort in life and death?” The answer:
That I with body and soul, both in life and death, am not my own, but belong unto my faithful Saviour Christ; who, with his precious blood, has fully satisfied for all my sins, and delivered me from all the power of the devil; and so preserves me that without the will of my heavenly Father, not a hair can fall from my head; yea, that all things must be subservient to my salvation, and therefore, be his Holy Spirit, He also assures me of eternal life, and makes me sincerely willing and ready, henceforth, to live unto him.[14]
Similar distinctions between body and soul are mentioned in questions 11, 26, 34, 37, 57, 109, 118, and 121.
The Treatise of the Faith and Practices of th National Association of Free Will Baptists reads, “God created man, consisting of a material body and a thinking, rational soul…”[15] The Orthodox Creed of 1679 states,
The Bodies of Men after Death, return to Dust, and see Corruption but their Souls, or Spirits, which neither die nor sleep, having an Immortal Subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them; the Souls of the Righteous being then made perfect in Holiness, are received into Paradise where they are with Christ and behold the Face of God in Light and Glory, waiting for the full Redemption of their Bodies… And at the last Day, such of the Saints as shall be found alive, shall not sleep, but be Changed; and all the Dead shall be raised up with the self-same Bodies, and none other, although with different Qualities, which shall be united to their Souls for ever and ever…[16]
Again, this creed follows similar phrasing as previous confessions. This creed does seem to take a dichotomous position, using the term soul and spirit as direct synonyms.
It is interesting that the content on anthropology in these confessions is held in view of the articulated and anticipated eschatology. In these historical statements, conceptions of personhood were understood in light of the eschaton, and assumed ethical dynamics. Today, conversely, our inquiries of personhood often begin with questions about human dignity, thus beginning with an ethical perspective, rather than an eschatological one.
Since the Free Will Baptist Treatise argues or at least allows for a form of dualism, and does not rule out a holistic approach, adopting Cooper’s perspective seems to be the best synthesis of positions. Holistic dualism “posits that the human person, though composed of discrete elements, is nonetheless to be identified with the whole, which constitutes a functional unity.”[17] This approach seeks to reconcile a distinction of two substances within the person with the interconnectedness of both body and soul.
Forlines, in positional agreement with Cooper’s argument, writes, “A human being consists of a body and a sprit. Viewed as a functioning unity as a conscious thinking, feeling, acting being, a human being is called a soul or person. A human being still remains a soul after the death of the body, but is not complete. He or she awaits the resurrection of the body.”[18] Cooper’s definition is similar. At length, he states,
Holism… affirms the functional unity of some entity in its totality, the integration and interrelation of all the parts in the existence and proper operation of the whole. It views an entity as a single primary functional system, not as a compound system constructed by liking two or more primary function systems. It recognizes entities as phenomenological and existential unities. It implies that the parts do not operate independently within the whole, and that they would not necessarily continue to have all the same properties and functions if the whole were broken up.[19]
Cooper gives plenty of examples to substantiate his position. He notes how those who appear from the dead retain a personal identity. Even more, their personal identity is manifested in a quasi-bodily being. That is, their form is that of an earthly body, even though it may be of an ethereal mode.[20] This is consistent not only in the Old Testament, but also the New, with prophets reappearing after their death in ways that make them appear physically identifiable.
In many ways, Cooper’s position is at odds, or at least inconsistent with, a Cartesian or even Platonic dualism that argues for strict separation between essential substances. Cooper argues for a dualism, inasmuch as the human person can “come apart,” though they both argue that this separation is not ideal, and it is not the final “form” of the human person. Thus, while the position may rightly be referred to as dualist, it is in contrast to a form of dualism that affirms full distinction between the parts of a person. Both Cooper and Forlines have a view of dualism that place identity on the whole person. This is opposed to a more Cartesian or Thomistic dualism that place identity primarily or exclusively on or in the mind/soul.[21] If we agree with Forlines, Cooper, and Hoekema, then we would argue that does not think of their body (or their mind) as a tool or machine to possess or use, but as fundamental to their personal identity. In other words, we would argue that we are body and soul.
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[1] Cooper, Body, Soul, & Life Everlasting, 3.
[2] Cooper, Body, Soul & Life Everlasting, 10–14.
[3] Pete Mandik, This is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 7.
[4] Mandik, This is Philosophy of Mind, 16.
[5] Mandik, This is Philosophy of Mind, 17-18.
[6] Cooper, Body, Soul & Life Everlasting, 2.
[7] Mandik, This is Philosophy of Mind, 8.
[8] Joel B. Green, “Body and Soul, Mind and Brain” in In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2005), 14.
[9] Cooper, Body, Soul & Life Everlasting, 165.
[10] See Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer, eds., In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2005) and J.P Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics.
[11] J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature the Crisis in Ethics, 3rd ed. (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000), 21.
[12] Cooper, “Biblical Anthropology is Holistic and Dualistic,” 424.
[13] Arminius wrote, “ “I confidently declare that I have never taught anything, either in the church or in the university, which contravenes the sacred writings that ought to be with as the sole rule of thinking and of speaking, or which is opposed to the Belgic Confession or to the Heidelberg Catechism, that are our stricter formularies of consent” Arminius; cited in Carl Bangs, “Arminius As a Reformed Theologian,” The Heritage of John Calvin, ed. John H Bratt (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), 216; cited in Pinson, “Will the Real Arminius Please Stand Up?,” 123.
[14] Heidelberg Catechism, accessed August 1st, 2019 http://www.heidelberg-catechism.com/pdf/lords-days/Heidelberg-Catechism.pdf Emphasis added
[15] A Treatise of the Faith and Practices of the National Association of Free Will Baptists (Nashville: Executive Office, National Association of Free Will Baptists, 2013), 5.
[16] Baptist Studies Online: Confessions of the Faith “The Orthodox Creed” accessed August 1st, 2019
[17] Joel B. Green, “Body and Soul, Mind and Brain” in In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2005), 13.
[18] Forlines, The Quest for Truth, 151.
[19] Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 45.
[20] Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, 59.
[21] Moreland and Rae, Body & Soul, 20-21.